Seongbum Lee , Psychiatric Injury and Secondary Victims in Medical Negligence(2025)
<Abstract>
This article examines the decision of the UK Supreme Court in Paul v Royal Wolverhampton NHS Trust [2024] UKSC 1, which considered whether bereaved relatives who witnessed the death of a patient caused by medical negligence could recover damages for the psychiatric injuries they suffered. Unlike earlier cases involving accidents such as road traffic collisions, this case raised the novel issue of whether secondary victims may recover compensation in circumstances where the harm does not result from a conventional accident but from clinical negligence. In doing so, the Court closely examined the scope of the duty of care and the policy considerations limiting the extension of liability.
The majority judgment, while reconsidering the concept of an ‘accident’ developed in prior case law, held that the duty of care owed by healthcare professionals does not extend to the patient’s family members in such circumstances. It concluded that a death resulting from medical negligence does not constitute the kind of sudden and shocking event required to establish liability for psychiatric injury, and therefore dismissed the claims of secondary victims. In contrast, the dissenting opinion reasoned that the death itself could amount to the relevant event and contended that, even in the context of medical negligence, secondary victims who suffer psychiatric injury should receive protection comparable to that afforded in other areas of tort law.
This judgment provides a valuable opportunity to re-examine the personal scope and normative foundations of liability for shock-based damages in tort law. It also underscores the enduring tension between foreseeability, fairness, and policy considerations in defining the boundaries of the duty of care. Drawing on comparative perspectives, particularly from German tort doctrine, this article analyzes the reasoning in the Paul case and explores its implications for Korean civil law. It argues that Korean tort law, like other civil law systems, would benefit from clarifying the legal basis and scope of claims for psychiatric injury by secondary victims—especially in light of contemporary medical realities and the growing recognition of mental health as a legally significant form of harm. By situating the Paul case within a broader comparative and theoretical framework, the article not only elucidates the limits of the current English approach but also offers insights for the future development of Korean tort law on secondary victim liability.
<Key words>
medical negligence, tort liability, secondary victim, Schockschaden, damage, the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom
Seongbum Lee , Psychiatric Injury and Secondary Victims in Medical Negligence(2025)
<Abstract>
This article examines the decision of the UK Supreme Court in Paul v Royal Wolverhampton NHS Trust [2024] UKSC 1, which considered whether bereaved relatives who witnessed the death of a patient caused by medical negligence could recover damages for the psychiatric injuries they suffered. Unlike earlier cases involving accidents such as road traffic collisions, this case raised the novel issue of whether secondary victims may recover compensation in circumstances where the harm does not result from a conventional accident but from clinical negligence. In doing so, the Court closely examined the scope of the duty of care and the policy considerations limiting the extension of liability.
The majority judgment, while reconsidering the concept of an ‘accident’ developed in prior case law, held that the duty of care owed by healthcare professionals does not extend to the patient’s family members in such circumstances. It concluded that a death resulting from medical negligence does not constitute the kind of sudden and shocking event required to establish liability for psychiatric injury, and therefore dismissed the claims of secondary victims. In contrast, the dissenting opinion reasoned that the death itself could amount to the relevant event and contended that, even in the context of medical negligence, secondary victims who suffer psychiatric injury should receive protection comparable to that afforded in other areas of tort law.
This judgment provides a valuable opportunity to re-examine the personal scope and normative foundations of liability for shock-based damages in tort law. It also underscores the enduring tension between foreseeability, fairness, and policy considerations in defining the boundaries of the duty of care. Drawing on comparative perspectives, particularly from German tort doctrine, this article analyzes the reasoning in the Paul case and explores its implications for Korean civil law. It argues that Korean tort law, like other civil law systems, would benefit from clarifying the legal basis and scope of claims for psychiatric injury by secondary victims—especially in light of contemporary medical realities and the growing recognition of mental health as a legally significant form of harm. By situating the Paul case within a broader comparative and theoretical framework, the article not only elucidates the limits of the current English approach but also offers insights for the future development of Korean tort law on secondary victim liability.
<Key words>
medical negligence, tort liability, secondary victim, Schockschaden, damage, the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom